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Index Politics
Negotiating Competitiveness Agendas in Costa Rica and Nicaragua
Sofie Tornhill
Abstract
Yearly published competitiveness indexes make possible immediate comparisons 
of investment and productivity climates around the globe. Against the backdrop 
of an increasing linkage between competition, “good governance” and poverty 
alleviation within development rhetoric and practices, this article places the agenda 
of competitiveness in the context of political struggle. Based on extensive interviews, 
I situate the “global” discourse of competitiveness in the diverse conditions of two 
Central American countries, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, in order to explore articulations 
and legitimacy claims of business associations and labor organizations respectively in 
processes of labor market flexibilization and economic change. Focusing on labor–
capital and state–market relations, the study contributes to the understanding of how 
principles of competition are promoted, negotiated and contested within transnational 
divisions of labor. 
Keywords: competitiveness | labor market flexibilization | the Competition State | 
class relations 
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1. Introduction
A recent film captures well how non-business interests view the growing global 
pressures to become “competitive”. Images of belching smokestacks, bare landscapes 
and workers, sometimes fogged and filmed in double speed, who engage in seemingly 
outsourced or informal labor activities flash by in the video produced by a Central 
American campaign that gathers unions, feminist and migrant organizations in a 
campaign against the flexibilization of work in the region. Other scenes show waving 
US and European flags, the logos of the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund and multinational corporations, pointing to an opposition of interests rooted in 
divergent positions within circuits of production and consumption as well as to their local 
and transnational institutional underpinnings. At one point in the film, a Costa Rican 
deputy proclaims the need for workers to understand that the choice in the context 
of contemporary globalized economic relations is not between jobs with or without 
security; instead, it is a choice between having a job or no job at all. This film signifies an 
intervention into the debate about the social, political and economic effects of economic 
agendas based on privatizations, deregulations and free trade agreements in the 
Central American countries. It portrays a context in which transnational economic elite 
interests overshadow workers’ collective demands and struggles against exploitative 
working conditions, with increasing effectiveness. The message it conveys is one of a 
shrinking space for politics in the wake of duplicable, streamlined agendas aiming to 
obtain a competitive position in the global economy. 
This article engages with principles of private sector-led development that are analyzed 
from the perspective that globalization is simultaneously a process and a project, 
relying upon and enforcing particular knowledge regimes (Peck 2002; Massey 2005). 
Speaking to the convergence between trade and development politics, institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations and the World Bank have 
all promoted combined strategies of macro-economic reforms and micro-economic 
measures to enhance the openness of markets to products and investment as well 
as local entrepreneurship. Competitiveness, represented as an engine of employment 
opportunities, is thus turned into a basic ingredient of poverty alleviation programs. 
Such policies, however, are not simply imposed from the outside; in order to avoid 
a depiction where localities are understood as the products of globalization, it is 
necessary to pay attention to “the local production of the neoliberal capitalist global” 
(Massey 2005: 101). 
Most often, reforms centered on competitiveness and an export-led growth agenda are 
not the result of a visionary and decisive state, nor merely the effects of demands from 
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international lending institutions. Instead, (trans)national coalitions between political 
elites, state technocrats, private business leaders and foreign aid officials normally 
play a significant role. Such policies therefore involve a relationship between market 
reforms and forms of political rule: the ways in which policy is produced, disseminated 
and legitimized. In this kind of a relationship, business conglomerates play a special 
role – their increasing prominence and political influence comes through links that are 
sometimes institutionalized but often personal. These links, particularly the personal 
ties, tend to be much weaker for other interest groups: labor, small farmers and small, 
domestic businesses (Teichman 2001). In this way, agendas of competitiveness come 
to constitute a cornerstone of societal organization that rearranges class relations on a 
global scale. As the conditions of work are made increasingly precarious, conventional 
forms of political organization based on local labor relations or class identity are also 
altered and conceivably undermined (Cammack 2009; Dörre 2010).
I conducted interviews in Nicaragua and Costa Rica with the participants in the policy 
process related to the introduction of competitiveness. This paper provides an analysis 
of the discourses of parties on both sides of the standard capital / labor dichotomy 
(although neither category is in practice regarded by participants as coherent).1 Thereby 
it aims to contribute to the understanding of how economic reforms are embedded in 
struggles over legitimacy, over what counts as the “common good” and “acceptable” 
labor market conditions in the name of competition and economic growth (see Foucault 
1991; Bacchi 2009). 
The prospects of finding a competitive position in the world economy differ in the two 
countries. Costa Rica is often portrayed as the good example in the region, while 
Nicaragua tends to be located to the other end of the spectrum (Schatan and Rivera 
2008a). In Costa Rica, inclusive welfare politics with relatively high levels of redistribution 
have, since the economic crisis that began in the 1970s, been partly supplanted by 
privatizations and the deregulation of the public sector (Wilson 1994; Mora Salas and 
Pérez Sáinz 2009; Castro Méndez and Martínez Franzoni 2010). In Nicaragua, the 
return of the Sandinista party (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, FSLN) to 
power in 2007 implied a partial disassociation from the neoliberal economic agenda of 
the preceding governments, for example through joining the Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Peoples of Our America (Alianza Bolivariana Para Los Pueblos De Nuestra America, 
1 This working paper is based on approximately 30 interviews conducted in Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica in 2011 at organizations representing the private sector, such as chambers, think tanks and 
business schools; public and public-private institutions and unions; feminist, human rights and 
migrant organizations that are part of campaigns against labor market flexibilization. I have chosen 
not to include the names of the people interviewed in order to protect their integrity, but I do include 
the names of the organizations, since that is of importance for the analysis. All interview quotes are 
my own translations from Spanish. 
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ALBA). At the same time, the party came back to power in coalition with many of 
its former foes: the Liberal Constitutionalist Party (Partido Liberal Constitucionalista, 
PLC), the Catholic Church, the private sector and even former Contra rebels (Burbach 
2009; Close 2009; Tornhill 2010). 
The two countries thus provide two different cases to examine how the “universal” 
political agenda of competitiveness is being promoted and negotiated against the 
backdrop of distinct positions within the global division of labor and divergent relations 
between political and economic centres of power, allocating legitimacy to political 
projects and their effects on gendered and class-based inequalities. Using two very 
different cases also allows this research to identify what is common to the global 
competitiveness policy which depends less on local configurations. 
2. Competitiveness Evaluations
The video produced by the campaign against flexibilization shows clearly how 
the relatively cheap labor force has been turned into Central America’s primary 
comparative advantage, and how the well-being of each individual worker is irrelevant. 
Their rationalized, categorized and monotonous work activities and lack of possibilities 
for organization form the basis of profitable future investment prospects. Analyzing 
circuits of production, Massimo De Angelis writes about capital accumulation on a 
global scale in terms of a fractal-panopticon. As in Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, 
which was designed to monitor subjects who were likely to deviate from a given norm, 
such as prisoners or workers who could escape or loiter, the potential of being seen 
has a disciplining effect on various agents in the global economy. When information 
and capital flow instantly, and data collection enables constant comparisons, “virtual 
watchtowers” potentially measure, chastise and reward conduct in accordance with 
the market model, turning “subjects and activities into data, shadowy projections of 
real subjects” (De Angelis 2001: 5). 
Since they are designed to enable immediate assessments of business climates in 
different countries, international ranking systems of competitiveness arguably function 
as such virtual crow’s nests in this scheme. Countries, their governments, public 
sectors and labor markets are condensed into analytical diagrams that encourage 
pre-investment comparisons and also serve as rectifying incentives for policymakers. 
Attempts to induce competitiveness with measurable content are made for instance by 
the World Economic Forum (WEF), which ranks nations yearly according to its Global 
Competitive Index. It defines competitiveness as, “the set of institutions, policies, and 
factors that determine the level of productivity of a country. The level of productivity, 
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in turn, sets the sustainable level of prosperity that can be earned by an economy” 
(WEF 2011: 4, emphasis in original). Competitiveness is indicatively presented as a 
thoroughly contextual concept, meaning that the bases of competition depend upon on 
which “stage of development” a country is determined to be. The stages of development 
that the WEF identifies consist of three categories: (1) Factor-driven economies: 
institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary education; 
(2) Efficiency-driven economies: higher education and training, goods market efficiency, 
labor market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, market 
size; (3) Innovation-driven economies: business sophistication, innovation (WEF 2011: 
9-10). The WEF ranks 139 countries based on these nine pillars that are broken down 
to sub-questions used in firm surveys. The top three countries in 2010-2011 were 
Switzerland, Sweden and Singapore. Costa Rica is ranked 56, Guatemala 78, El 
Salvador, 82, Honduras 91 and Nicaragua 112 (WEF 2011: 15). Similarly, The World 
Bank initiative Doing Business  presents a ranking of 183 countries based on the ease 
of doing business within their borders. In general, Central American countries receive a 
medium to low rating, for example El Salvador is ranked 84, Nicaragua 117 and Costa 
Rica 125 (The World Bank 2010: 4).
These systems of benchmarking were an ever-present point of reference in discussions 
with both government and private sector representatives in Costa Rica and Nicaragua. 
They were evoked as alarm bells as well as landmarks in the evaluation of political 
measures to improve the relative position of the country. Notions of omniscient investors 
who can choose among all locations entail the challenge of being seen and assessed in 
the right way. For a representative of the Costa Rican Chamber of Exporters (Cámara 
de Exportadores de Costa Rica, CADEXCO), it would have been preferable to receive 
even faster feedback on actions taken, so as to assess if they are being received in 
the intended way:  
[Competitiveness indexes] are important because they are only thing we have 
to measure how we are doing as a country. Obviously we would prefer if they 
were updated more often, to get signals periodically. That way we wouldn’t have 
just an annual report but more capacity for analysis.2 
Economic and political measures are filtered and possibly reinforced through how they 
are perceived and portrayed. The indexes were not only conceived of as possible levers 
but also as problematic abstractions that could magnify already difficult circumstances. 
Especially in Nicaragua, signals from the competitiveness reports did not easily fit 
with public communications of progress. In the words of an official at the Ministry 
2 Interview, CADEXCO, 11 July 2011.
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of Development, Industry and Trade (Ministerio de Fomento, Industria y Comercio, 
MIFIC): 
Those indexes are like the face, what you see now. We recognize that there are 
still serious, serious, serious challenges and some weaknesses that make the 
country less attractive than we would have liked to.3
The effort to procure a positive image is akin to a “nation branding” campaign, a 
term that circulates in management and marketing literature. It captures strategies to 
cultivate and promote ideas about a place and its culture or attempts to refashion a 
country’s reputation. Simon Anholt, often described as the “guru” of nation branding, 
publishes the Nation Brands Index, which measures the power of countries’ brand 
names by comparing exports (images of products and services from each country), 
governance (perceptions of national governments’ competence), culture and heritage, 
people (the population’s reputation for education and friendliness), tourism, investment 
and immigration (potential to attract people for leisure, work or study) (see Anholt 
and GfK Roper 2008). In a global “attention economy” where information is lavish 
but interest difficult to attract, countries, like products, are promoted as brand names 
through marketing tactics (Aronczyk 2008). 
In Nicaragua, the challenge has consisted in distancing the country from its violent past. 
Negative evaluations potentially obstruct pledges of safe and profitable investment 
possibilities. Indeed, nation brandings are monologic articulations that cannot 
accommodate nuance, contradiction or disagreement (Jansen 2008). A strategy in this 
context can be to partly relativize the content of the indexes:
On the issue of competitiveness there has been a critique, we as government 
have frequently criticized many of the indicators of competitiveness that are used 
today [...] The thing is that we have some problems to answer the questionnaires 
that are the basis for the calculations of competitiveness  [...] I am not trying to 
say that if we did everything right we would have been evaluated as the best 
ones, no. But the country would not have been as off as it is now apparently 
perceived to be.4 
 
Struggling with negative representations that in the view of the MIFIC official did not 
correctly reflect all the positive aspects of the country or the progress that had been 
made, the official also described how the ministry was planning to develop their own 
3 Interview, MIFIC, 29 July 2011. 
4 Interview, MIFIC, 29 July 2011. 
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competitiveness indicators to avoid producing information based on misunderstandings. 
Similarly, a representative at the investment agency PRONicaragua described the 
indexes as desktop products that risked giving a lopsided perception of the country: 
The companies that contract a consulting firm to do a pre-selection, that’s the 
case when those indexes affect the most because that firm does not do field 
work. We have discovered that our principle aim must be to make them come to 
the country. 90 per cent of these companies leave Nicaragua with a completely 
different view than they had before they visited. There are many publications that 
give negatively manipulated images of the country, based on a few indicators 
taken out of context.5 
Here, Nicaragua is depicted as particularly affected by persistent adverse preconceptions 
that allegedly tended to change when visitors encountered a reality not captured by the 
report indicators that diverged from their expectations of war and political turmoil. The 
opposite problem was faced by private sector representatives in Costa Rica: it was 
often argued that the reputation that the country has acquired might be more positive 
than the actual conditions. Costa Rica is perceived to have failed to adopt proactive 
policies to maintain its positive image created in the past: 
When you hear about Costa Rica in other countries, a lot of people say “Ah, 
great country, oh, high-tech, oh, high literacy levels!”, but when you look a bit 
under the surface, it’s not really like that. I think that the country is living off 
its old merits. If you look at the studies of the World Bank, it is really sad, the 
position that Costa Rica has. This country differs a lot from Nicaragua and the 
rest of Central America, but every time less! Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, those are countries that are totally stagnated.6 
Within the competitiveness logic, high rankings are easily framed as a national 
interest, but the indexes do not refer to the level of a nation. Although Nicaragua is 
represented as being unfairly judged and Costa Rica as falling towards the level of its 
Central American neighbors, what the reports attempt to measure is not the economic 
strength of nations but business effectiveness within and across their territories. A 
central aspect of competitiveness is the functionalist role it ascribes to regulatory 
frameworks and state policies when the facilitation of firm operations is to be ensured. 
In the view of Paul Cammack, this represents an endeavor aiming to the “completion of 
the world market”. Thereby, international organizations as well as states are to ensure 
5 Interview, PRONicaragua, 3 August 2011.
6 Interview with competitiveness consultant, 17 August 2011. 
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the institutionalization of the “general conditions for capital accumulation”, rather than 
focusing on local or national variations or conflicts generated in economic relations 
(Cammack 2009: 37). 
3. The Competition State 
Good investment climates are nurtured by broad public support: a consensus 
in favor of building a more productive society can facilitate policy improvements 
regardless of the political party or group in office […] Open and participatory 
policymaking and efforts to ensure that the benefits of a better investment 
climate extend widely in society can help to build that support (World Bank 
2005: 7).
In the above quotation, the World Bank urges the establishment of a broad consensus 
beyond contentious political positions. Through policymaking (that comes closer to 
administration than to political decisions) and public support, the investment climate 
and the general economic agenda is not to be revoked by election results or social 
disruption. In Latin America, the threat of disorder is often assigned to the rise of populist 
left-wing governments. The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) describes the 
dangers of populism in one of its reports: “dysfunctional leaders can hold an irresistible 
attraction for the public” as they claim to have “the answer to all problems, while 
promising to spare society as a whole and individual citizens from confronting their 
own problems and taking responsibility for them” (IADB 2001: 14-15). 
In the context of Central America, the United States has long used trade and investment 
policies in attempts to foster specific political powers and to combat leftist radicalism 
(Rosen 2002; Villafuerte Solís 2008: 137-8). The Free Trade Agreement between the 
United States, Central America and Dominican Republic (DR-CAFTA) is in the following 
quotation described by the US government as an efficient tool to ward off war, chaos 
and communism: 
In the 1980s, Central America was characterized by civil war, chaos, dictators 
and Communist insurgencies. Today, Central America is a region of fragile 
democracies that need U.S. support. Elected leaders in the region are embracing 
freedom and economic reform, fighting corruption, strengthening the rule of law, 
battling crime, and supporting America in the war on terrorism. But anti-reform 
forces in the region have not gone away. CAFTA is a way for America to support 
freedom, democracy and economic reform in our own neighborhood (USTR 
2005).
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Synergetically, free trade will enhance “economic reform” in Central America, benefit 
the interests of the United States in its “own neighborhood” and ensure that the “anti-
reform forces” in the region are kept away from political influence. The kind of state that 
is asked for in the quotations above is one that actively takes responsibility for reforms, 
which in development rhetoric is often referred to as country ownership. In these 
efforts, international institutions may serve as strategic partners, providing knowledge 
and “sound policy advice”, whereby particular political projects are propped by expert 
authority (Charnock 2008). 
Theories of the Competition State focus on transformations of state-market relations 
that generalize the competition imperative to a transnational level.7 The politics 
of competitiveness are given consistency and legitimacy through its relation to the 
discourse of “good governance” that has been widely promoted in development rhetoric 
as key to improve enterprise climate, to open economies for trade and investment, to 
enhance primary education and to ensure infrastructural adequacy. For instance, in the 
report about challenges for competitiveness in Central America, Rivera and Schatan 
(2008: 10) write that measures of deregulations have proved insufficient to counter 
market distortions such as corruption, monopoly and trusts: “trade liberalization in and 
of itself does nothing to eliminate the propensity of firms to adopt anti-competitive 
practices. Similarly, privatization in no way assures that companies will behave better 
than their public sector predecessors as they are capable of erecting private anti-
competitive barriers in the place of state ones”. In the light of the perceived failings of 
such market reforms in the “Third World”, Greig Charnock detects a need for extra-
economic explanations amounting to a new consensus that development is dependent 
upon institutions that facilitate or hinder the functioning of markets (Charnock 2009). 
That is to say, a new institutionalism in development politics depicts institutional failures 
to stand in the way for “equitable growth” and poverty eradication.
As pointed out by Marcus Taylor, and as mirrored in the World Bank’s call above for 
consensus beyond contending political positions, the Competitive State is ideally a 
depoliticized and depoliticizing state that from a technical horizon responds to economic 
“facts” such as inflation rates and balance of payments (Taylor 2010). In interviews 
with both private and public sector representatives in Costa Rica, political stability 
was often put forth as one of the main incentives for foreign investment. The lack of 
major political conflicts was perceived to locate the general economic direction beyond 
ideological differences: 
7 See special issue of Policy Studies, 31, 1 (2010).
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So regardless of the party that is in the government, it is clear that the country 
needs to continue to attract foreign investment. What’s more, and this is my 
personal view, ideologically there isn’t a very strong difference between one party 
and the other, among the ones that are traditionally in power. The governments 
have always had their eyes on foreign investment and we have always counted 
with their support.8
The ideal absence of competing political positions is here described by an representative 
of CINDE (Coalición Costarricense de Iniciativas de Desarrollo, Costa Rican Investment 
Promotion Agency), an organization that is in many ways emblematic for new forms of 
political governance. Founded in 1982, CINDE was the outcome of an alliance between 
(trans)national private sector interests in Costa Rica and the United States. With civil 
wars in El Salvador and Guatemala and the revolution in Nicaragua, US financial 
support to Costa Rica substantially increased, and CINDE was fully funded initially by 
USAID (United States Agency for International Development). Massive public relations 
campaigns were carried out, underlining connections between exports, employment 
and social welfare; the establishment of CINDE in Costa Rica can be regarded as an 
experiment – it was the largest and most ambitious private-sector business promotion 
project that the US State Department had financed abroad at the time  (Clark 1997). 
In this constellation, the Costa Rican state was a spectator rather than a participant in 
the development and implementation of this new agenda of export-led growth.  State-
market relations depicted in theories of the Competition State suggest that it is not 
only the political content that is at stake but also the very form that politics can take as 
the division between public and private actors in policymaking is being altered. Thus, 
the state becomes a primary subject and object of restructuring in competitiveness 
endeavors (Taylor 2010; Lemke 2001). 
In conversations with business representatives in both Costa Rica and Nicaragua, 
a proactive state responding swiftly to private sector demands was perpetually 
characterized as an unattained vision:  
Every fourth year, a new commission of competitiveness is created, and a new 
program of linkage, and they talk about the importance, we compare ourselves 
with “look at that country and the relations between the universities and industrial 
sector!” They do a few little things, but there is no clear medium or long term 
orientation.9 
8 Interview, CINDE, 6 July 2011.
9 Interview, Costa Rican Chamber of Industry (Cámara de Industrias de Costa Rica), 7 July 2011.
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Just as her predecessors had done, Laura Chinchilla initiated her presidency in 2010 
with the formation of a new Competitiveness Council. In the view of the representative 
of the Costa Rican Chamber of Industry, a pronounced commitment to the promotion 
of competitiveness is part of the obligatory discourse of every new administration, 
resembling a ritual more than concrete actions and future plans. If a legitimacy 
principle resting on the government’s ability to promote export-led growth is adopted, 
the commitment to competitiveness will be part of political claims, which then risk being 
drained of specific political content. 
While private sector representatives in Costa Rica tend to critique the state for the 
lack of more palpable and future-oriented effects of public-private dialogues, a sense 
of shared sets of values is generally expressed. By contrast, in the case of Nicaragua, 
common baselines are to a larger extent still under contestation. With the return of 
Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista Party to power in 2007, the interchange between 
the government and the public sector dramatically changed, at least to begin with. 
Returning anew to power, the party attempted to carve out its political identity through 
reconnecting to an alleged origin; in public speeches and policy documents the current 
regime is portrayed as the second stage of the revolution that began in 1979 and 
was then interrupted by 16 years of neoliberalism. In the following quote, the political 
direction of the FSLN is characterized by business representatives as a reversal of 
political and economic advances:
There is no political will, or rather there is a negative political will. The negative 
will is that competitiveness is neoliberalism, that it shouldn’t exist in Nicaragua. 
That it would make the companies poorer and drive them out of business. Well, 
very mistakenly, this is a negative attitude that is very mistaken. With this there 
practically cannot exist a program of competitiveness.10 
Business representatives claim here that the FSLN government situates competitiveness 
in opposition to the national interest, as part of a neoliberal agenda that it is attempting 
to dismantle. On a similar note, a business school representative and competitiveness 
consultant portrayed the national interest promoted by the government as threatening to 
foreign investments, the basis of economic progress. The state that is being described 
is far from approaching the ideals of a competition state. Rather it comes close to the 
“populist state” that competitiveness reports warn about, which creates conflicts and 
blames national problems on external forces: 
10 Interview, Nicaraguan Chamber of Commerce (Cámaro de Comercio de Nicaragua), 2 August 2011.
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But we are an unstable, corrupt country with little transparency and are inefficient 
in many things. We even have to change the message that we deliver publically 
to the investors. We have to tell them, “come, we are going to treat you well and 
if there is a problem we will try to solve it”. We shouldn’t call them exploiters, 
capitalist and […]  how do you say? Neoliberals. Then, who is going to invest?11 
With time, however, the relation between the public and the private sector in Nicaragua 
after the return of the Sandinista party turns out to be less confrontational than it is 
commonly portrayed to be. While in the first years, nearly all private sector representatives 
interviewed described government-business relations as characterized by interrupted 
communication and mutual mistrust, later developments smoothed the initial tensions 
somewhat. The narrative of conflict serves most clearly the interests of both sides in 
claiming faithfulness to their values. Even in the early years, shortly after the FSLN 
came to power, COSEP (Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada en Nicaragua, 
Higher Council on Private Enterprise), the most influential association for private 
enterprise and a vocal opponent of the revolution in 1980s, published a development 
plan described as the result of a historic agreement between the government and 
the private sector. A rapprochement between the government and the public sector, 
manifested in several joint commission meeting frequently, can then be represented 
as the result of a gradual process towards dialogue. In an interview with two COSEP 
officials, it was described how the government had come to realize that collaboration 
is a “question of win-win”. Just as several other private sector representatives did, they 
even described the interactions with the current government as actually more regular 
and productive than they had been during the preceding governments of the Liberal 
Party, despite the ideological orientation that was then shared: 
Thus I say, and it is my slogan, that for the first time I think that COSEP forms part 
of the social and economic fabric of Nicaragua, but also politically. But politically 
in the sense that it is very oriented towards the condition of the nation. That’s 
to say, our political party is Nicaragua. The best proof of this is that sometimes 
one needs courage in a country as polarized as Nicaragua; if the government 
makes a good decision economically speaking – applaud it. Publicly. To say 
that we agree. But to do that in this country you need courage. And we should 
never break this bridge of communication because that is where the solutions 
are found. In a culture that isn’t used to dialogue. In country where dialogue is 
criticized.12 
11 Interview, INCAE Business School (Instituto Centroamericano de Administración de Empresas), 25 
July 2011.
12 Interview, COSEP, 12 August 2011.
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Here, COSEP is described as having won political influence at a level that it did not 
previously have. To express public approval of the economic policies of its former enemy 
is portrayed as an act of courage and as a way to overcome deadlocked positions. 
Therefore, the representatives explained, COSEP would break with precedent and 
abstain from endorsing any of the political parties in the presidential elections of 2011, 
which in effect can be read as a silent approval of the government. 
Though business representatives in both Nicaragua and Costa Rica underline the 
importance of a functional state and public-private governance, the private sector is 
often represented as more apt to promote a national common good impartially (“our 
political party is Nicaragua”). Whereas the state is represented as unable to define viable 
economic agendas, or even to hinder their viability, the private sector is said to stand 
for continuity and public credibility, here in the words of COSEP and a representative 
of a Costa Rican think tank focusing on the expansion of innovation and high-tech 
production: 
In a nutshell, the name of the game doesn’t change, regardless of the government. 
I have a phrase: the governments change, the governments rise and fall, but 
what never falls and always remains is the private sector. In Sweden you must 
have companies more than 100 years old, and there is no government, not even 
a political party that has lasted for a 100 years.13 
What we have is very interesting I think, not a lot of countries have this. In 
many countries it’s propaganda, it’s what the government does, these issues 
are managed by the government. But then there is often mistrust and the people 
think “ah, just politics!” and the initiative is lost.14
In contrast to volatile and self-interested governments, the private sector is represented 
as unbiased. The values that allow for the private sector to play a political role have 
twofold effects. Not only is the private sector gaining a larger political space, but the 
public sector is increasingly being influenced by market logics and values (Crouch 
2004). Overlaps between economic and political elites are then expectable. In the view 
of a trade union representative, the recent deregulation of large state institutions and 
companies in Costa Rica, such as the social security agency and telecommunication 
company have spurred the fusion of public and private sector values: 
13 Interview, COSEP, 12 August 2011.
14 Interview, Estrategia Siglo XXI, 11 July 2011.
      desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series No. 46, 2013 | 13
The mutation of politics goes from the statist politician to the politician who is a 
businessman, who as a politician has commercial interests and all of that. And 
the last mutation is the businessman that turned himself into politician. This is 
the kind of politician who dominates today. He’s representing the interests of 
commercial groups and he is not a statist. All the efforts to changes the laws are 
to the benefit of the economic sector.15
These transformations of state-market relations, the union leader argues, imply an 
alliance between the state and capital interests that effectively blocks the influence of 
the labor movement. Indeed, in discussions of the Competition State, the entanglements 
of national and transnational capital as well as the merging of economic and political 
power are analyzed in terms of elite notions of globalization (Cerny 2010; Evans and 
Lunt 2010). If the traditional role of social democratic governments was to balance the 
demands of capital and labor, a more solid alliance between the state and the private 
sector creates shared interests that exceed the power of the labor movement. There 
is of course a possibility that a corresponding alliance could be formed between labor 
and the state, something that is feared by a representative of the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Nicaragua (Cámara de Comercio Americana de Nicaragua, AMCHAM): 
So what are the fears, the risks? Above all because of the past of the Sandinista 
government. They were in power for 10 years and they turned the economy into 
a disaster. An extremely important issue is the legal security. The Sandinista 
party has a tremendous control over the judicial authority and the Liberal 
Party’s control is rather reduced. This means that every issue that is brought 
to discussion at the judicial authority can be solved politically. That is to say, if 
IKEA comes to make an investment and fills out all the documents and do all 
their work correctly, but then there is a claim from a group of workers against 
the investors from IKEA, and if this group of workers has any party connection, 
precisely to the Sandinistas, and present a judicial claim, then it is very likely the 
company will lose.16 
 
Based on the FSLN’s politics in the past, the AMCHAM representative mistrusts the 
government’s commitment to legal frameworks, arguing that it could unpredictably 
and unlawfully support workers’ (unjustified) claims in a dispute with a transnational 
company. This fear can perhaps be ascribed to the apparent existence of parallel 
agendas within the Sandinista government. Analogously, a vocal project of integration 
with Venezuela, Cuba and the other nations within ALBA, the critique against 
15 Interview, Asociación de Servicios de Promoción Laboral (ASEPROLA), 16 August 2011.
16 Interview, AMCHAM in Nicaragua, 8 August 2011. 
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neoliberalism and the search for an alternative development trajectory are carried 
out along with a more “hushed” project where CAFTA and the emphasis on foreign 
investment and export-led growth remains (Tornhill 2010: 108). 
Some questions arise in relation to theories of the Competition State: if they suggest 
that such states already exist, and if so, which states fit the description, and is it, after 
all, of significant importance? Certainly, companies have not avoided countries as sites 
of investment even though their politics diverge from notions of “good governance”, 
China being a notable example (Taylor 2010). The relative unimportance of whether 
a state complies, or not, with all the desirable characteristics that the competitiveness 
indexes list was noted by the representative of the AMCHAM in Nicaragua who 
expressed his alarm above: 
Many times, and this is perhaps not so ethical on behalf of the companies but 
it is the reality and not so positive for competition. If Nicaragua does not have a 
very good reputation, why do they come here to invest? There is an enormous 
potential for growth. If you go to visit the manager of Hotel Intercontinental, he 
is Dutch, a very nice guy, you’ll find him smiling. Because he has an occupancy 
rate of 85 per cent and sometimes there is not a single vacancy. Those people 
are all business people; they’ve come to look for business in Nicaragua. I’m not 
lying! Despite the government and the political situation, despite the president 
who is attacking everyone, the investment doesn’t stop.17
As long as profitable business opportunities await, the AMCHAM representative argues, 
investment will keep finding its way into the country. This, perhaps, indicates that the 
emphasis on competitiveness can be read more as a discursive rationale that provides 
policy-makers who navigate tensions within today’s capitalist relations with justifications 
for macroeconomic discipline, rather than as a blueprint for microeconomic decisions 
on investment and production allocation. 
4. Opportunity as Legitimacy 
A competition economy is contingent upon a competition society, prescribing particular 
social relations and forms of conduct for citizens as workers, consumers, entrepreneurs 
and as political subjects at large. It therefore becomes imperative to “win the hearts 
and minds” of the population, to foster consent for a political project of competition. An 
important foundation of legitimacy, reflected in various competitive reports, is by Neil 
Lunt described as the “opportunity society state” (Lunt 2010). For instance, the World 
17 Interview, AMCHAM in Nicaragua, 8 August 2011. 
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Bank opens its report A Better Investment Climate for Everyone by stating that it is 
“about creating opportunities for people to escape from poverty and improve their living 
standards” (World Bank 2005: xxiii). Everyone, from farmers and microenterprises 
to multinational corporations should “have opportunities and incentives to invest 
productively, create jobs, and expand, and thereby contribute to growth and poverty 
reduction” (World Bank 2005: xiii ).
If opportunity figures as the “big idea” in politics of competitiveness, it also aligns 
individuals to unequal market effects. In comparison to conceptualizations of opportunity 
in terms of outcome within for example the Keynesian welfare state, the focus here  is 
placed on procedural considerations. Competition is thus organized around the notion 
of opportunity, with largely individualized, supply-side explanations for failure and 
success. While competition policies are often depicted in inclusive terms that allegedly 
will contribute to the well-being of all, lines of conflicts are sometimes discerned. These 
lines go both between capital and labor and between different groups of workers and 
contending capital interests. The World Bank presents a diagram over “winners and 
losers from reform” that explains how competitiveness reforms will benefit “new entrants” 
on the market while the position of state-sector workers and “oligarchs and insiders” 
will be undermined (World Bank 2002: 93). In their report about competitiveness in 
Central America (Schatan and Rivera 2008a), the influence of oligarchs and other 
interest groups that attempt to capture the state are represented as a crucial problem 
that turns the region into a “fertile land for anti-competitive practices” (Schatan and 
Rivera 2008b: 1). In this way, competitiveness politics is represented to be in line with 
consumer interests, but often colliding with corporate, monopolistic interests.
The notion of winners and losers was also often reflected in interviews with private 
sector representatives. In efforts to achieve economic growth through privatization, 
deregulation and increased focus on export production and free trade agreements, it 
was presumed that producers unprepared for competing on global markets would face 
difficult times: 
We have to make priorities. We have to support the successful and stop 
subsidizing the failures. We have to identify those who have the capacity to 
compete on the international level and support them. And then, well “those 
exporters are already the big capital!” Some of them have accumulated wealth 
etcetera, etcetera, but that is precisely what we eventually want! What you want 
are successful companies that manage to transform the lives of those who work 
hard. Being successful, they can pay higher salaries, more taxes and there is 
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progress for the entire society. Sometimes the losers die, it could be, but that’s 
normal.18 
Emphasized in the quotation above is that protectionist measures are unjustified or 
doomed to fail. Objections on the grounds that large corporations will benefit while 
small-scale producers are driven out of business are dismissed on the grounds that 
successful firms have a positive effects on society at large. In order not to compromise 
with the common good, the “failures” will have to be sacrificed. The argument mirrors 
the point made in the competitiveness indexes that the comparison of states should 
not be perceived as a call for competition at the level of countries. Citing Paul 
Krugman’s description of competiveness as a “dangerous obsession”, the IADB warns 
against a national, protectionist drive that could be taken to imply that economic 
strength is measured by external trade surplus, that imports are undesirable because 
the displacement of national employment and that lower salaries in other countries 
constitute a threat (IADB 2001: 1). 
Contrary to the ideal promoted in the indexes of competitive business climates that 
does not correspond to the nation level, however, several private sector representatives 
depicted a conflict between national and transnational interests. The privileging of 
transnational levels, and the inconsideration of national ones, is denounced below by 
a representative of the Costa Rican Chamber of Industry. In a context where a national 
industrial policy is perceived to be lacking, the government is criticized for jeopardizing 
national production, in particular that of vulnerable small scale producers, through 
carelessly signing a free trade agreement with a major rival: 
You often feel like, for example when they take decisions that are of a political 
kind, that from the point of view of a national vision, you say “but in what direction 
are we going?” For example, a case where the Chamber did not agree was 
the free trade agreement with China […]  What are the true opportunities for 
us? From our perspective, they are very few. It can affect the competitiveness 
above all for the small and medium companies that will probably not be able 
to compete against the industrial production of China, that great factory of the 
world. Or the issue of quality. We know that in China the products range from 
excellent to trash. Has the state of Costa Rica the capacity to prevent that? 
Products of bad quality that will compete with national products? And this within 
a framework where we do not have a clear politics of support for the national 
production.19 
18 Interview, INCAE, 25 July 2011. 
19 Interview, Costa Rican Chamber of Industry, 7 July 2011.
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As pointed to here, the portrayal of state and private sector interests as merging in 
competition agendas must be modified. The private sector, of course, encompasses an 
array of actors and activities with divergent locations within the circuits of production. 
When the “common good” is equated with the prioritizing of successful companies, 
the scope to denounce unequal conditions or to maintain opposed interests – that are 
still recognized as legitimate – is arguably delimited. Union leaders in both Nicaragua 
and Costa Rica described the difficulties in putting labor relations on the agenda. Their 
claims that the current economic agenda should be evaluated in relation to harmful 
working conditions were often dismissed with reference to broader national interests: 
To link the health of the workers to the hours they work, the movements that 
they make, the psychological and fiscal harm and to point out that this is not 
considered within the regime of labor risks and to link it to politics; the truth is 
that they are really annoyed by us. So the campaign has been very criticized 
in this sense. That we obstruct progress, the development of the country. That 
we are looking for problems, that we don’t let the country advance and that the 
labor relations stagnate.20
The issue of competitiveness, it’s an argument that they use, that our struggle 
goes against the competitiveness, which is totally false. Because they are the 
ones who are damaging the competitiveness, because when the lower the 
standards of work, when they give up on the aspirations of decent work, they 
are violating this principle, because it is to compete with inequality. So then don’t 
blame us.21
Certainly, the struggle for legitimacy is taking place in a context marked by social and 
economic divisions. In The New Spirit of Capitalism, Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello 
contend that the expansion and durability of the capitalist system is contingent upon 
its ability to continuously present itself as an acceptable order (Boltanski and Chiapello 
2005). Indeed, the pursuit of persistent profit accumulation arguably makes little 
sense to the many, upon whose commitment the system is nonetheless dependent. 
The spirit of capitalism, Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello argue, is not something 
constant, but rather something that must be rephrased. Since its “internal” logic (profit 
accumulation) cannot stand on its own, it is dependent upon “external” morals. More 
recently, arguments in development rhetoric are repeatedly articulated on behalf of 
20 Interview, Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros (UPINS), Costa Rica, 15 July 2011.
21 Interview, Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores José Benito Escobar (CST-JBE), Nicaragua, 9 
August 2011. 
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groups that used to be largely absent from middle-of-the-road accounts of economic 
growth. “The women” and “the poor” have made their way into development reports, 
where they are fitted into the alleged connection between progress and integration into 
globalized economic relations (World Bank 2000; 2001). Increased global economic 
interactions are portrayed as bringing opportunity to those with the loosest grip on 
the labor market. In an interview, an official of an organization that promotes linkages 
between multinational corporations and small-scale producers in Costa Rica described 
a project on female entrepreneurship, financed by the Coca Cola Company:  
A: That the women are, well that they can strengthen themselves as women, 
as mothers and as leaders of other women. They can for instance be mentors 
for other women, so that they become like them. And on the other hand and 
within parenthesis, although it’s true that it’s not within the main objectives, but 
in the medium term it could be that if the store sells more, then Coca Cola can 
also sell more products, which is after all a business […] These kinds of things, 
I would say, are not bad. Some people might get upset. But unfortunately, or 
luckily, that’s how things are, because it is the only way to finance a project like 
this one […] If we make the small companies more competitive and at the same 
time make the big company richer […] well, that’s how it is. 
Q: But when you are helping Coca Cola, maybe next door there is someone 
selling juice who’ll lose costumers […] 
A: But the point is, we will begin this with the objective that the women are 
empowered as women. [The representative of Coca Cola] said, and I agree a 
lot with what he said; “if this is not sustainable, we can’t finance a project of a 
thousand stores because at the moment when I show my numbers they’ll tell 
me ‘well, you invested so much money and there is no result for the business’.
 Therefore, this has to be a result”. 22 
Here, the empowerment of women – and rather in terms of gender relations (“as woman, 
as mother, as leader”) than in terms of class or labor relations (it does not matter if 
the large company improves their market share at the expense of smaller actors) – 
serves as a legitimating postulate that downplays the conflict between expansion by 
multinational companies and the ability of small-scale producers and vendors (many of 
whom are women) to stay in business. Then, with reference to an ethical commitment, 
the potential outcome of extensive marketing strategies, that smaller actors are driven 
out of competition, can still be framed in terms of corporate social responsibility. Such 
22  Interview, FUNDES, 16 August 2011.
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a detachment of women’s alleged empowerment from economic and labor relations 
has also been used to counter the arguments of the campaign against flexibilization. 
A trade union representative describes how women’s interests are being invoked to 
justify the deregulation of the labor market, at the same time reproaching unions for not 
acknowledging the importance of women’s possibilities to advancement: 
They discredit us to the point that they say that we are lying, that the flexibility 
is something good. The other day we saw the chamber promoting home-based 
work, saying that the people will rest more. Yes, it’s in the newspaper. So, what 
can we say to counteract this? For them, it is very easy. They find Maria who 
is a professional and who wants to develop herself professionally but she is a 
housewife and she has her children. So she says that it is an option for her, “I 
can work from my home, I make my own schedule and I maintain a relation with 
my children”. And that’s how they sell this idea.23 
Working irregular hours, in practices often innumerable and unpaid, without contract, 
social security or the possibility of social interactions is framed as in line with women’s 
interests. The recent rise of the discussion about the precariat (a neologism that 
combines “precarious” and the “proletariat”, see Standing 2011) is perhaps foremost 
an indication that the kind of insecure, temporary and informal conditions that have long 
characterized women’s and migrants’ labor have now, with the deterioration of unions 
and the relative security of Fordism, come to affect previously more protected groups. 
As Ivor Southwood points out, a possible difference between the precariousness 
of post-Fordism and its earlier variants is the enthusiasm that surrounds it; both by 
politicians and the private sector it is celebrated as liberation from restraining contracts 
and conformity (Southwood 2010). 
The extra-economic, social focus that induces economic transformation with legitimacy 
must therefore be scrutinized, not the least with emphasis on the strategic role that 
conceptions of “women” and “poor” seem to play. Nancy Fraser argues that feminist 
theory has inadvertently come to be part of the legitimization of capitalism in its 
flexible, transnational version (Fraser 2009). The feminist critique, she contends, of 
androcentristic, state-organized capitalism (manifested, for example, in the “family 
wage” that presupposes a male breadwinner) now furnishes flexible capitalism with 
an element of moral authority. Professional women’s attempts to break through the 
glass ceiling as well as women’s struggle to make ends meet through low-wage jobs 
may all be read as signs of the dismantling of traditional structures of domination that 
increases opportunities for women. A proto-feminist agenda comes to coincide with the 
23  Interview, UPINS, 15 July 2011.
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demands of capitalism when the supposed interests of micro-borrowers or workers in 
labor-intensive export production are evoked as a justification for current development 
measures (Spivak 2000). 
With the establishment of the market as the primary domain where social demands 
should be met, the notion of opportunity is perhaps most markedly incarnated in the figure 
of the entrepreneur, as mirrored in the conversation above. Mike Davis interrogates the 
image of the “heroic self-employed”, a favorite figure among development agencies: 
with a small loan, the poor, almost always women, are turned into entrepreneurs, 
supposedly enabling them to leave poverty behind (Davis 2006). This strategy was 
critically evaluated by a representative of Costa Rica’s Chamber of Industry:
The issue of entrepreneurship, it is not subsistence, something that is 
unfortunately often mixed up. In all the institutions of social support, they create 
programs; “let’s make businesswomen!” The big solution for single women in 
trouble is to turn them into businesswomen. So a lot of resources are dedicated 
to try to turn women into entrepreneurs although she has neither the capacity 
nor the skills to solve a problem which is of a different kind. It is a social problem. 
We have women, single mothers and the more problems they have: “we have to 
turn her into an entrepreneur!” In the end, the outcome is very limited. Probably 
not a single woman will be pulled out of poverty. When you think about it, the 
success cases are always the same. Haha! It’s the same! It’s the same lady 
that you showed me three years ago! It’s the same lady with the handbags! In 
many cases it only creates frustration. Because at the end of the day, we can’t 
turn people that don’t have the possibility to run a business into businessmen 
or businesswomen.24
The somewhat scornful tone reveals, perhaps, a misgiving that the ideals of 
entrepreneurship might be tainted by the failures of female subsistence producers. But 
the answer also suggests that the expectations placed on the entrepreneur might be 
threatened by self-employment within the informal economy, marked by displacement 
from rather than connection to the global economy. In a context where structural 
adjustment programs have resulted in the stagnation of the formal economy and an 
explosion in the informal economy, Davis contends that such self-employment is better 
conceived of as “forced entrepreneurialism”. When a risk-taking entrepreneur who 
accumulates her own value is elevated to a moral example, the distinction between 
productive and unproductive subjects is being inscribed through global and national 
projections of the self (Skeggs 2004). Indeed, individualized explanations for success as 
24  Interview, Costa Rican Chamber of Industry, 7 July 2011.
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well as for failure on the levels of states, sectors and subjects suggest no links to diverse 
positions within global economic interactions and uneven developments. Mismanaged 
resources and lack of entrepreneurship, then, account for the predicaments of those 
who have failed to capitalize on their opportunities. 
5. Flexibility and Labor Relations 
Labor markets play critical roles in agendas of competitiveness and constitute arenas 
of continuous transformation and struggle. Advantages yielded by laxer regulations 
are easily copied and therefore not permanent; actors who seek increasing profits 
by means of the flexibilization of employment are thus constantly compelled to refine 
their strategies (Dörre 2010). In discussions with public and private representatives 
in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, “human capital” was often represented as one of the 
most important factors for economic growth. But the labor force and the labor markets 
are also regarded as an actual or impending threat: the labor force as inadequately 
educated and the labor market as too rigid or prone to cause social unrest. During an 
interview at PRONicaragua, the official presented a diagram comparing labor market 
risks. The bars, indicating for instance the strength of unions, labor market conflicts and 
wage-restrictions, where low numbers equaled low risk, constituted, according to the 
official, a useful tool in emphasizing secure and profitable investment opportunities.25
  
Similar assessments in competitiveness indexes reward the absence of regulations 
that hinder reorientations of labor markets. The WEF maintains that labor market 
flexibility is imperative to ensure that workers “are allocated to their most efficient use 
in the economy and provided with incentives to give their best effort in their jobs” (WEF 
2011: 7). Flexibility here denotes minimum wage levels that stimulate job creation, 
low obstacles for hiring and firing so that workers can be shifted between different 
economic activities and wages that may fluctuate “without much social disruption”. 
In this way, the composition of the labor market comes to constitute a comparative 
advantage or a competitiveness obstacle:
The Costa Rican labor market has a great advantage. It is a very flexible 
labor market, it has always been very flexible, it’s very quickly adjusted to new 
conditions. Versus how it is in other countries [...] But also we don’t have the 
politics, which is the case in Europe and the US, that generate unemployment, 
25 Costa Rica was, according to the diagram, the most secure country, with an estimated labor risk of 
just above 30 on a scale of 0 to 100, followed by Nicaragua with an estimated risk of 50. Honduras 
was considered to be the country with the highest risk in region, just above 80 in the diagram 
(PRONicaragua 2011).
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for example unemployment benefits. In Spain there is an insurance that makes 
it convenient to be unemployed. There isn’t that kind of incentive in Costa Rica.26
 
The Costa Rican labor market is here described as comparatively capable of 
fast adaptations. Despite a much more far-reaching social security system than in 
neighboring countries, unemployment security remains low, which in the view of 
the interviewee serves to counteract institutionally-fuelled tendencies for workers to 
withdraw from the labor market. The virtual absence of private-sector trade unions 
accounts for low estimations in the labor risk diagram for Costa Rica. After the civil 
war in 1948 and the banishment of the Communist Party, left unions were strongly 
repressed and the social democratic branch with its close ties to the government was 
also weakened. Since the 1940s, all except five of the hundreds of strikes that have 
taken place have been declared illegal, exempting employers from responsibility in 
case of dismissals (Castro Méndez and Martínez Franzoni 2010: 86). 
Through comparisons of flexibility, insecure working conditions and weakened trade 
unions become part of the observations of the “virtual watch towers” (De Angelis 
2001). Wages may be held down when all nodes compete by means of the quantity 
and quality of labor. However, private and public representatives in Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua insisted that competition centered on low salaries was not a desirable path. 
Especially in Costa Rica, it was claimed that the country was beyond low-cost labor 
competition. Still, the costs for labor seemed difficult to keep out of the calculation: 
It is also a country that in comparison to the other countries in Central America 
has a production cost, a cost of the labor power that because of the social 
system, excellent to maintain, but this from the point of view of competing on 
the international market [...] it becomes more expensive for us to produce and 
maintain a social system than what it is in the countries that we compete with. 
We have a cost for social taxes that weigh heavy on the sector in terms of 
competitiveness.27 
The dilemma is here spelled out as one where the social security system (“excellent 
to maintain”) implies that the competitiveness of the country is crumbling under its 
pressure. Welfare has to be weighed against competition within an antagonism that 
is not often readily recognized. Indications of increased income gaps and social 
inequalities in Costa Rica are also framed, partly, as signs that steps in the right 
direction have been taken:
26  Interview, Costa Rican Competitiveness Council, 15 July 2011.
27  Interview, Costa Rican Chamber of Industry, 7 July 2011.
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There is an oversupply of human capital exactly at the moment when we are 
losing competitiveness in low-skill production. So we have an oversupply and 
the wages are very low. On the other hand, for those who have studied there is 
an excess of demand and their salaries are going up. So there is a polarization, 
and that’s what’s happening at the moment. It’s an effect of the model, but 
it’s not a result of the politics of liberalization. The model of the country that 
hasn’t bothered to eliminate loads of jobs so that they transform faster to really 
sophisticated companies.28 
The existence of low wages are not represented to be so much an effect of today’s 
economic relations, of that which currently makes the country competitive, but rather 
as backlogs within the system and a remainder of an outdated model built on earlier 
production relations. It also seems as if wages appear to be low when compared 
to the higher wages that are the result of successful transitions to more effective, 
qualified and profitable production. Thus, political responsibility for wide income gaps 
is relinquished, as low wage jobs will disappear when the labor market is properly 
adjusted. The focus should instead be placed on the elimination of less “sophisticated” 
jobs. Education was commonly portrayed as one of the most fundamental challenges 
in such a process. In Costa Rica as well as in Nicaragua, private sector representatives 
called for a transformation of the entire educational system in order to make the labor 
force compatible with corporations’ demands:
We have to stop educating poets, although we are the country of Rubén Darío; 
we need people in the areas where the country is competitive. The universities 
should educate their students so that they fulfill the necessities of the companies. 
In the US, there is an education program in wine, in which all courses are about 
the production of wine. We should do the same here; we should have schools 
specializing in peanuts, sugar, tourism, maquila, out-sourcing and those kinds 
of things; the sectors where there is a real prospect of competitiveness.29  
Through meticulous specialization, the entire person should be adapted to its role 
in production; everything not immediately applicable to the logics of accumulation is 
deemed redundant. However, the idea that wage gaps are the result of outmoded 
production relations and that proper education will entail the eradication of low-paid 
and informal forms of labor is clearly counteracted by the rapid increase of such sectors 
in most countries. Rather than reminders of the past, the polarization between “high-
28  Interview, Costa Rican Competitiveness Council, 15 July 2011.
29  Interview, INCAE, 25 July 2011.
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skill” and “low-skill” work can be regarded as decidedly constitutive of contemporary 
economic relations and competitive positions within global orders of production.
The relation between competitiveness and wage levels came to the fore in Nicaragua 
when the FSLN gained power. In accordance with the labor law, the minimum wage 
was then revised every six months, something that was rarely enforced during the 
previous governments. In the Free Trade Zones (FTZs), wage levels were significantly 
raised, which several private sector representatives described as part of the initial 
conflict with the government:30
Those were decisions that were not taken from a technical or economic point 
of view but from a political one. It was decisions that were often taken at the 
main square or at a political meeting. In our view, that’s not the correct way to 
promote investments or to promote the productive sectors of the country. Not 
in the sense that there should not be wage increases, but that the economic-
productive factor would have to be taken into account in order not to generate 
problems of competitiveness on the international markets. Then the crisis 
came. The closing down of companies implied the loss of employment and the 
government started to worry about how the sector could be strengthen and then 
the politics started to change.31 
After the initial raises, increases have continued only modestly and with the participation 
of and in agreement with the private sector. The COSEP representatives contended 
that their involvement in the regulation of wages has had widely positive effects, not the 
least to the benefit of those within the informal economy:
Because those who benefit are those who are already employed but it creates 
walls that disallow that more people are contracted or that those who want to 
formalize can. But with the increase of 24 per cent, formal employment went 
up. So it must be recognized that COSEP doesn’t do this in its own interest. 
The fruits of these constructive dialogues between the government and COSEP 
have entailed the well-being of all.32 
 
30 Between 1995 and 2006, the increase in the minimum wage in the FTZs was 18 percent. Between 
2007 and 2010, the minimum wage was increased four times and amounted to 137 USD per month 
(compared with 85 USD per month in 2006). By comparison, the cost of living in Nicaragua in 2009 
was about 400 USD per month (Canales Evest 2010: 4B). 
31 Interview, Nicaraguan Chamber of Industry, 3 August 2011.
32 Interview, COSEP, 12 August 2011.
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Here, business representatives allude to a conflict between those in relatively secure 
positions and the weakest segments of society. In solidarity with the unemployed and 
those within the vast informal sector, salaries must be kept down so that rising prices of 
consumer goods do not worsen their situation. Those temporarily or more permanently 
excluded from capitalist production thus come to represent a latent pressure to reduce 
labor costs and to provide investment incentives (Dörre 2010: 59). Omitted from this 
account of the connection between minimum wages, inflation, unemployment and 
informal labor conditions is the impact of the elite’s own demands for profits and 
deregulation. In a similar way, the World Bank argues that labor market regulations may 
constitute a clash of interests between workers and potential workers. As the economy 
is increasingly opened to competition, new job opportunities within the private sector, 
often under less regulated conditions, will be created, at the same time displacing 
jobs within the state sector characterized by higher levels of security. Suggesting that 
there is a trade-off between labor protection and the cost of doing business, the Bank 
contends that strict labor laws can have a negative effect on job creation. Thus, the 
aim would be to find a middle course between “workers’ preference for “employment 
stability” and corporations’ “need to adjust the work force” (World Bank 2005: 11-12). 
This, it is, argued, will also eventually counter social inequalities: 
More job stability for some workers often implies fewer job opportunities in 
the formal sector. So it is not surprising that stricter employment laws are not 
associated with a more equal labor market. If anything, income disparities tend 
to be greater in countries with stricter regulations [...] Women, young people, and 
the unskilled – facing greater difficulties in obtaining a job in the formal sector – 
are more frequently unemployed or engaged in informal activities (World Bank 
2005: 149).
In accordance with this line of reasoning, measures to enhance flexibility, though 
perhaps contrary to the interests of “privileged” workers, can be regarded as tools to 
improve the situation of marginalized groups, in correspondence with the interests of 
women, youth and the unskilled. However, at the same time as the supposed interests 
of particular groups are being evoked, the argument is also part of an effort to foster a 
competitive individualism within the framework of marketized social structures that in 
effect disband groups and the basis for collective action (Taylor 2010). Indeed, in the 
wake of political and economic restructuring of production and labor markets, bargaining 
strategies of trade unions have been undermined (Anner 2009; Pillay 2007). In this 
way, labor market reforms can be viewed in the light of the struggle over the meaning 
of women’s/workers’ interests as well as over in which arenas and by which means 
 Tornhill - Index Politics | 26
such interests are to be advanced – market mechanisms or collective bargaining and 
political regulations? 
The disintegration of collective identifications and increased conflicts between workers 
was described by union leaders as an effect of the extension of one set of market 
principles to all social interactions: “competitiveness also creates competitiveness 
between people”.33 Within such a context, to make collective claims becomes 
problematic, leaving the unions largely without a strategy in the wake of the altering 
organization of production and employment that are intertwined with changing values 
and expectations: 
If someone complains, the rest will say: “the horror! Why did you do it? Now 
they’ll come and they’ll start to bother us. They’ll close the factory and throw 
us all out. Don’t complain! Work or rights; choose, what do you want!?” The 
people go for work, that’s the sad thing. We live at a very critical moment. And 
the unions don’t have a clear strategy. Now we see the informalization of formal 
work, and it is going to be the general rule. This is, in my view, capitalism’s 
paradise: no barriers, no barriers.34 
When legal regulations and traditional unions are losing strength, drawing attention to 
problems may be perceived as leading to even more problems. The scope for imagining 
what kind of conditions a job should entail is shrinking. As the deputy stated in a matter 
of fact fashion in the video discussed in the introduction, the choice is increasingly 
limited to that between a job and no job at all. This was, of course, always a reality 
for the majority of workers, but it is arguably becoming more generalized with the 
consequence that it is difficult even to visualize labor relations differently. Without legal, 
social and political protection and in the absence of collective strategies, labor becomes 
suitable for flexible production “by an openness to capital(ization)” (Cherniavsky 2006: 
xx). Indeed, the fear among workers that leads them to defend their jobs rather than 
to make demands coincides with employers losing their fear for the unions; as the 
bases for collective strength are being undermined, the possibilities of impact is largely 
enabled primarily by lingering memories of a past struggles – but perhaps not for long:
Here the unions say: “we still frighten them with the skin of the tiger”. There 
isn’t anything anymore, there is no tiger but the skin can still frighten. And it is 
33  Interview, UPINS, 12 July 2011. 
34 Interview, ASEPROLA,16 August 2011. 
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true, the roar of some unions can still scare them. But that’s as far as it gets; to 
delaying and defending.35 
6. Conclusion
In order to approach the differentiating conditions and outcomes of the politics of 
competitiveness, it becomes important to make explicit the kind of interests that are 
being underpinned within its discursive frame. Simultaneous processes of legitimization 
and delegitimization have been discernable in the discussion here. On the one hand, 
a discourse of competitiveness encourages a condensation between economic and 
political spheres and an alignment of interests at the elite level. Against the backdrop 
of this alliance, the strategies and claims of labor movements, on the other hand, 
may be isolated when relations between capital and labor are increasingly dominated 
by the organization of production. Opposed positions in economic and ideological 
terms are negated, and national interests are portrayed as converging with those of 
the (trans)national companies for which the model fits. When the visual field of the 
state is narrowed to capture the sectors and individuals that correspond to the ideals 
of competitiveness, such as innovation and entrepreneurship, other jobs and sectors 
tend to disappear from political agendas as well as from the understanding of complex, 
polarized economic structures that are inherent to principles of competitiveness. 
Part of the fostering of legitimacy rests on invoking the interests of “marginal groups” 
as “women” or as “the poor”, rather than as “workers”. For them, an insecure job is 
represented as an improvement in relation to their perceived alternatives. Along the 
lines of the logic, however, these groups can be recognized as such upon entering 
paid labor, but once within the system they are not to act collectively upon such 
possible identifications. With reference to opportunity, unequal positions of nations, 
sectors, groups and individuals can also be depoliticized by the same gesture that 
disconnects them from structural explanations. If richness and poverty are regarded 
as mutually independent conditions, precarity can be considered to be a condition that 
can be alleviated through education or improvement of “human capital” in ways that 
do not cost privileged groups nearly as much as redistribution or protection of workers’ 
rights. The politics of competitiveness, as it has been discussed here, can therefore 
be conceived of as simultaneously fuelling the polarization between privileged and 
subjugated groups, as well as negating their interconnectedness within a framework of 
structural inequalities.
35 Interview, ASEPROLA, 16 August 2011. 
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